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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: WHEN IS A SWIMSUIT
NOT A SWIMSUIT?
When is a swimsuit not a swimsuit? Answer - according to the
court in Poe v. Missing Persons,' ("Poe ") it's not a swimsuit when an
artist creates merely an interpretation of a swimsuit. This decision of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates the conceptual difficulty in
enforcing copyrights and characterizing works of applied art.2 Gregory
Poe, ("Poe") an artist, filed an action for damages against the rock group
Missing Persons claiming copyright infringement for a piece he described
"as an artwork in the medium of soft sculpture."3 Entitled "Aquatint
No. 5," the work resembled a swimsuit and was worn by lead singer Dale
Bozzio on the front cover of Missing Persons' debut album.4
Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted Missing Persons' motion for summary judgment. The
Court of Appeals, reversing the order, remanded the case for trial be-
cause evidence revealed a disputed issue of material fact, namely whether
Aquatint No. 5 was a utilitarian article of clothing or a work of art.'
A graduate of the California Institute of the Arts, Poe is an artist
and clothing designer whose styles are recognized throughout the fashion
world. He claimed that Aquatint No. 5 was created in 1978 as "an art-
ist's impression or rendering of an article of clothing.... It stands by
itself as a work of conceptual art."6 Poe regarded the article as a work of
art, and presented it at an art show sponsored by the Los Angeles Insti-
tute for Contemporary Art.
In 1979, a photographer named Carla Weber asked to borrow Poe's
work, reportedly for use in her portfolio, and photographed Dale Bozzio
wearing it. Aquatint No. 5 was marked "Gregory Poe ©," at the time it
was photographed. This photograph, as Poe subsequently discovered,
1. 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
2. Works of applied art "encompass all original pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
that are intended to be or have been embodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as
mass production, commercial exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent pro-
tection." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5668 (hereinafter cited as "H.R. REP. No. 1476").
3. 745 F.2d at 1239.
4. Id. at 1241.
5. Id. at 1239.
6. Id. at 1240. Indeed in his application for copyright, Poe declared the article to be a
"three-dimensional work of art in primarily flexible clear-vinyl and covered rock media." Id.
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appeared on the front cover of the band's first album "Missing Persons."'7
Although the album cover credited Poe as the designer, he had not con-
sented to Aquatint No. 5's use, and subsequently filed a copyright in-
fringement action against Missing Persons.
I. AQUATINT No. 5: "WORK OF APPLIED ART"
OR "USEFUL ARTICLE?"
The appellate court had only one question to answer in resolving
this dispute. That question was whether Aquatint No. 5 was to be identi-
fied as either a copyrightable "work of applied art," or simply a "useful
article."' This distinction has confused courts for over thirty years,9 pro-
7. Id. at 1241.
8. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) provides, in relevant part:
§ 101. Definitions
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three-dimen-
sional works of fine, graphic, and applied art.... Such works shall include works of
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article... shall be considered a picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.
A "useful article" is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article
that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a "useful article."
17 U.S.C. § 102 provides generally for copyright protection of "pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works."
9. An examination into how the courts and statutes have distinguished between "works
of applied art" and "useful articles" is helpful at this point.
The current Copyright Act replaced the 1909 Act. In relevant part, 17 U.S.C. § 5(g)
(1909), indicated that "[w]orks of art; models or designs for works of art" are eligible for
copyright protection. This language is more fully elaborated in regulations drafted by the
Register, codified in 37 C.F.R. § 202.10. For instance in 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1948), protec-
tion is provided for "works of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned .... "
The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), ratified § 202.10(a), when it
upheld copyright protection for a statuette used as a lamp base. Mazer stood for the principle
that commercial use does not disqualify an otherwise registrable work of art from copyright
protection. Under Mazer, conceivably any useful article somewhat aesthetically pleasing in
appearance, could be afforded copyright protection with respect to its form. For a lengthier
discussion, see 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 208[B] 2-88 (1986).
As a result, ensuing decisions have upheld copyrights for a wide range of articles. See,
e.g., Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(designs printed on scarves); and Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940
(S.D. Cal. 1961), affid, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962) (Christmas decorations).
As a result of Mazer, in 1959 the Copyright Office implemented the following Regulation:
(c) If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility; the fact that it is unique and
attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a
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ducing differing standards on how these terms should be applied.'"
Under the present Copyright Regulation,II a work is a "useful article"
and denied copyright if it has "an intrinsic utilitarian function." This is
so regardless of whether the article has other functions which are not
utilitarian. 2 Thus, copyright can be denied to an article if one, and only
one, of its "intrinsic" functions has utility.'
3
The district court in Poe, then, had to be convinced that Aquatint
No. 5 was a "work of applied art" 4 before copyright protection would be
granted to its' sculptural features. In other words, protection would be
utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture. . .which can be
identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such
features will be eligible for registration.
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959) (emphasis added).
10. Esquire v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979),
restricted the interpretation of § 202.10(c), while in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl,
Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980), the court adopted a more expansive view.
Esquire denied copyright registration for a lighting fixture claimed to have a distinct
shape. The court supported the principle that industrial designs are not eligible for copyright,
noting repeated Congressional rejection of legislation facilitating such protection. The court
used as support the House Report drawing the line between copyrightable works of applied art
and uncopyrighted works of "industrial design," which states that, "although the shape of an
industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the [House Copyright] Com-
mittee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill." H.R. REP. No. 1476,
supra note 2, at 5668.
The Esquire court treated the "physically or conceptually" statement in § 202.10(c) as an
"isolated reference." Esquire, 591 F.2d at 803-04. The court considered the passage in its
entirety and held that the overall design of a utilitarian object, even if determined by aesthetic
as well as functional considerations, is not eligible for copyright. Id.
Esquire further restricted the "sole intrinsic function" phrase in the 1959 Regulation. The
district court granted copyright protection since the lighting fixture's "sole intrinsic function"
was not utility; it served a decorative purpose as well. On appeal, this was rejected on grounds
that the Regulation would be rendered meaningless. Id. at 804. Otherwise, so long as the
overall shape of a utilitarian article embodies dual intrinsic functions - aesthetic and utilita-
rian - then it could be copyrighted. As support, the court quoted the newly enacted Copy-
right Act of 1976 which denies copyright where "an" intrinsic function is utilitarian. Id.
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
Kieselstein, on the other hand, granted copyright status to two belt buckles described as
"sculptured designs cast in precious metals - decorative in nature and used as jewelry."
Kieselstein, 632 F.2d at 990. The decision was based on the view that "separability" could
occur either "physically or conceptually," quoting as support H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note
2, at 5668. The court saw in the belt buckles "conceptually separable sculptural elements"
deemed sufficient to accord copyright status. Kieselstein, 632 F.2d at 997.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See supra note 8. This is an almost verbatim repetition of the
C.F.R. § 202.10(c), but with a significant difference. Under the 1959 Regulation, copyright
protection is denied an aesthetically pleasing article only when its sole intrinsic function is
utility.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The appellate court defined this as, "an original sculptural work." Poe, 745 F.2d at
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granted in two particular instances: where no intrinsic useful purpose
was found, or, where the "sculptural features... [were] capable of ex-
isting independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article." 5 The dis-
trict court granted Missing Persons' motion for summary judgment. It
determined the article could be used as a swimsuit, which was an "intrin-
sic useful purpose" and "the functional aspects of the swimsuit are not
independent of the alleged sculptural/artistic aspects of the suit."' 6
II. USEFULNESS: A QUESTION OF LAW OR FACT?
The Ninth Circuit refused to uphold the summary judgment since a
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Aquatint No. 5's useful-
ness. 7 Upon reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that there was
a "disputed issue of material fact as to whether... 'Aquatint No. 5' [wa]s
a utilitarian article of clothing or a work of art."'" As such, the sum-
mary judgment was denied as a matter of law, and the case was reversed
and remanded."9
The appellate court reached this conclusion because it felt that Aq-
uatint No. 5's utility had not been adequately proven by Missing Persons,
noting that the only evidence of its use was the single occasion it was
worn by Dale Bozzio for the photograph session.2" On the other hand,
the court found ample evidence that Aquatint No. 5 was a piece of art-
work. This "critical factual question" as to the usefulness of the article
was for the "trier of fact [to decide] after a trial on the merits."'" Thus
the court would not decide as a matter of law whether Aquatint No. 5
could be worn as an article of clothing for swimming or any other utilita-
rian purpose, since it was not legally trained to make such a determina-
tion by a simple visual examination.22
At this point the Ninth Circuit described a useful article. First it
stated the Congressional definition of a useful article that appears in 17
U.S.C. section 101, which describes a useful article as, "an article having
an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appear-
15. Id.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1239.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1241.
21. Id. at 1242.
22. Id. See also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). "It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations." Id. at 251.
[Vol. 7
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ance of the article." 23
The Ninth Circuit examined the evidence presented by the two sides
at the motion for the summary judgment and found that Poe had tried to
create a work of art portraying an article of clothing. Significantly, it
could not find any evidence that Poe had created an article of clothing
that could function as a swimsuit. Thus, although Aquatint No. 5 might
look like a swimsuit, it was not proven to intrinsically function as one
which, as the Ninth Circuit noted, is required by section 101.24
III. THE COURT IS SYMPATHETIC To POE
Though not obvious, the Ninth Circuit appeared to be sympathetic
to Gregory Poe. While it reversed the district court decision on grounds
that a disputed issue of material fact existed, the opinion encouraged a
finding that Aquatint No. 5 was a sculptural work. First, the Ninth Cir-
cuit went to great lengths to describe Aquatint No. 5's appearance, 25
even though a photograph of the article accompanied the opinion. Sec-
ond, no mention was made of a crucial finding of fact by the district
court: that in 1982 the Copyright Office had refused to register the work
after Poe had applied for copyright registration.26 Third, the appellate
court actually quoted the description of Aquatint No. 5 that appeared in
Poe's copyright application, (a "three dimensional work of art in primar-
ily flexible clear-vinyl and covered rock media").27 Fourth, the court
noted that Aquatint No. 5 appeared in an art show sponsored by the Los
Angeles Institute for Contemporary Art.2' Finally, a lengthy portion of
Poe's testimony was reproduced in the opinion apparently to show the
distinction between his visual art, and his fashion designs of articles of
23. See supra note 8.
24. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1242.
25. Id. at 1241. Note the intentionally technical language that is used by the court:
One part consists of two pieces of clear plastic material cut in a figure 8 shape.
The figure 8 portion is 18 inches in length. The smaller loop of the figure 8 is 6'/2
inches across. The larger loop is 71/2 inches across. Within each loop is a sealed area
in the shape of a triangle filled with what appears to be crushed rock in a distinct
color. A 70-inch clear plastic tube has been inserted through the end of the smaller
loop of the figure 8.
The other section connects two pieces of clear plastic which have been cut into
an angular shape with eight sides, wider at the ends and tapering towards the center.
It is 151/2 inches long and 71/2 inches wide at each end. Within this eight-sided piece
of plastic are two sealed areas which also contain crushed rock in the same colors
present in the figure 8 shaped portion. The center has a width of three inches.
Looped into one end of this part is a 75-inch long clear plastic tube. Looped through
the other end is a 72-inch long clear plastic tube. Id.
26. Id.
27. 745 F.2d at 1240.
28. Id.
1987]
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clothing.29
The overall picture given was not one of usefulness, but of sculpture.
The court seemed to exert its influence and judgment, by using select
wording, to persuade the future lower court that Aquatint No. 5 was a
sculptural work. It was as if the court gave the benefit of the doubt to
Poe, despite the findings of the lower court.
Missing Persons argued that an article's usefulness is a question of
law,30 however, the Ninth Circuit decided that the authority presented
did not require every factual dispute over usefulness to be resolved as a
question of law.3" Indeed, the Poe court stated that since Aquatint No.
5's usefulness was still in dispute after all the evidence was presented, the
case could not be treated in the same manner as the cited authority.
32
IV. How Is USEFULNESS To BE SHOWN?
Missing Persons argued that Poe could not present any relevant evi-
dence to the trier of fact on the question of usefulness.3 3 Here again, the
Ninth Circuit was not convinced, stating that Poe had four possible
sources from which to present evidence. The first was expert testimony
concerning the usefulness of the article and whether any apparent func-
tional aspects could be separated from the artistic aspects. 34 The second
was evidence of Poe's intent in designing the article to determine whether
it possessed a utilitarian function.35 The third was evidence as to the
custom and usage within the artworld and clothing trade concerning
such objects.36 The last was evidence of an article's marketability as a
work of art.37
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1242. Missing Persons relied on Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890
(9th Cir. 1983). Fabrica sought copyright protection for a unique and high quality carpet
sample display folder. El Dorado argued not only was the folder a "useful article" as de-
scribed in § 101, but it was "functional" and therefore not protected. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals granted El Dorado's motion for a directed verdict, and found the folder was useful.
Distinguishing that case, the Poe court stated that a directed verdict was upheld in El Dorado
because it was undisputed, that the articles' "usefulness in marketing (was) their only reason
for existence." Poe, 745 F.2d at 1242.
31. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1242.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1243.
34. Id. (citing Trans-World Mfg. v. Nyman & Sons, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 95, 99 (D.Del. 1982)).
35. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1243 (citing Norris Indus. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (1 th
Cir. 1983)).
36. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1243 (citing May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363,
1368 (9th Cir. 1980)).
37. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1243 (citing 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.08[B], at
2-96.2-2-96.3 (1984)).
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This section of the opinion creates limitations. First, it is unclear
whether these factors should be the only sources from which evidence of
usefulness can be drawn, or whether courts can review other types of
evidence. Second, although these sources of evidence may help the trier
of fact to decide the action, there are plausible reasons, discussed below,
why they should not be reviewed.
This aspect of the opinion is most disturbing because of the Ninth
Circuit's deviation from earlier precedent discussing the manner in which
an article's usefulness is ascertained. As noted earlier, courts have strug-
gled for many years attempting to develop a distinction between "useful
articles" and "works of applied art.""8 The problem is a difficult one. In
this instance, the district court granted a summary judgment based on
the judge's view that Aquatint No. 5 was a utilitarian article. The Ninth
Circuit reversed the summary judgment, correctly recognizing the con-
cern that a judge should not arbitrate national taste based solely on his
view of art.39 In cases such as the one here, a summary judgment is
entirely inappropriate in view of Congress' dual concerns of protecting
artist creativity and preventing registration of industrial designs."
The first source of evidence suggested by the Ninth Circuit was evi-
dence from expert testimony.4 Such a standard may seem helpful, as
neither the Constitution nor the Copyright Act authorizes the judiciary
to arbitrate national taste. As noted earlier, the judiciary has no particu-
lar ability to assess the merits of one type of art compared to another,
since arguably the copyright law's encouragement of creativity and origi-
nality might be stultified.42 There are problems, however, with using ex-
pert testimony. The art world, by definition and form, contains much
variety. Should an artist's creativity and originality be controlled by tes-
timony from an expert trying to define whether a given article is a work
of art? Further, what happens when new artforms develop, yet to be
recognized by the art world? "
38. See supra note 9.
39. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1238.
40. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 5668.
41. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1243.
42. The argument has been made that the judiciary is not able to decide whether an object
is an applied work of art. But while "works of applied art" is "a loose phrase whose parameter
is hard to define; nevertheless.. .the mere fact that the phrase... admits of debate does not
make it different from many statutes whose interpretation is every day regarded as reviewable
by the courts." Vacheron & Constantin-Le-Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260
F.2d 637, 640 (2d Cir. 1958).
43. Mr. Justice Holmes stated in Bleistein v. Donaldson, 188 U.S. 239 (1903):
At one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in
1987]
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The second source suggested by the court was evidence of an artist's
intent in designing the article." In other areas of the law, courts have
largely examined the parties' intent to resolve disputes. Once again,
however, in this area, the examination of an artist's intent is a difficult
standard to apply. Congress has specifically stated that for the purposes
of registration, copyright protection should only be granted on the basis
of originality and creativity,45 not whether an artist intended to create a
work of applied art.46 Given the Ninth Circuit's standard, the door
would be opened to large numbers of industrial products, such as screw-
drivers with colored handles or elaborate televisions, based merely on an
artist's conception of his work.47
Further, such a standard contradicts the language of the Code of
Federal Regulations, which explicitly states, "[T]he registrability of a
work of art is not affected by the intention of the author as to the use of the
work, the number of copies reproduced or the fact that it appears on a
textural material or textural product."4 Additionally, looking at an art-
ist's intent contradicts the Supreme Court decision in Mazer, which
stated, "We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument
that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright
bars or invalidates its registration. We do not read such a limitation into
the copyright law." 49
The third source suggested by the court was evidence of custom and
usage within the art world.5 ° This is just as troublesome as the other
sources, since such evidence ignores the fact that an artform may be rev-
olutionary or unrecognized within the community.5" How a court can
which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when
seen for the first time.
44. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1243.
45. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980)
("[All works of art must meet] the basic requirements of originality and creativity ... ").
46. Esquire v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978). "The overall design or configur-
ation of a utilitarian object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as functional considera-
tions, is not eligible for copyright." Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 805. "Such an extention of the nondiscrimination principle would undermine
other plainly legitimate goals of copyright law - in this case the congressional directive that
copyright protection should not be afforded to industrial designs." Id.
48. 37 C.F.R. § 202. 10(a) (emphasis added).
49. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (emphasis added).
50. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1243.
51. As Professor Nimmer has stated:
[If] a work might arguably be regarded as a work of art by any meaningful
segment of the population, be they high-brow, low-brow, hippy, avant-guard, middle
class-bourgeois, adult or juvenile then the work must be considered a work of art for
copyright purposes.
[Vol. 7
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accurately define "custom and usage" must be questioned. This court
has given no guidelines. Indeed the task of defining custom and usage
would probably perplex the most knowledgable of art experts. Thus, it
must be asked whether a court has the ability to judge effectively and
objectively the difference between an artform that has been accepted as
custom, and an artform that has yet to be recognized as custom.
The fourth source suggested by the court, was evidence of an arti-
cle's marketability.52 It has been articulated that an article can be regis-
tered where "there is any substantial likelihood that even if an article had
no utilitarian use, it would still be marketable to some significant seg-
ment of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities."53 In
other words, if Aquatint No. 5 had no use as a swimsuit, the trier of fact
could be shown evidence that the article had retail value as a work of
applied art. However, as pointed out by Professor Nimmer, adopting a
"likelihood of marketability" standard is strange to copyright, being diffi-
cult to prove, and perhaps favoring more conventional forms of art.
54
The Ninth Circuit is seeking to establish a practical standard to dif-
ferentiate between a "useful article" and a "work of applied art." This is
a laudable intention, yet such a simple four-part test is unworkable due
to the complexities of "art." As recognized by Professor Nimmer, "[it] is
apparent that no very precise standard can be evolved which will deter-
mine in advance with any certainty whether certain borderline objects
will be regarded as works of art."55 Further as stated in the Supreme
Court decision in Mazer, "individual perception of the beautiful is too
varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art."5 6 By setting
out four factors by which a court can evaluate an article's usefulness, the
Ninth Circuit has attempted to define art - a task that is insurmounta-
ble for even the most knowledgeable of art experts. The court should
have followed the approach used by Mazer, that is, examine the entire
factual setting in order to decide the question of usefulness, without re-
stricting the types of evidence to be examined. Unfortunately, the Ninth
Circuit has effectively formulated a narrow conception of art.
A further problem is that the Ninth Circuit failed to examine the
1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.08[B], at 2-85 (1983).
52. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1243.
53. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 51, at 2-96.2.
54. Id. at 2-96.3. Note that this type of evidence also is restricted by the language in
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218. "We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument
that the.., use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registra-
tion." Id.
55. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 51, at 2-85.
56. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214.
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crucial differences between the opinions of Esquire and Kieselstein.' 7
Both of these cases relied on the same Congressional House Report58
which stated that an industrial product could not be protected unless
some element, either conceptually or physically, could be identified as
separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article.59 Whereas Esquire
stated that conceptual separability was insufficient, Kieselstein stated
conceptual separability was sufficient by itself to accord copyright protec-
tion.' In this case, had the Ninth Circuit explicitly followed the Kiesel-
stein approach, then arguably the case could have been decided merely
by looking at conceptual elements such as an artist's intent. Had the
court followed the Esquire approach, evidence of physical separability
would have to be shown before registration could be granted. However,
the court never even discussed this issue.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION FOR COPYRIGHTING WORKS OF
APPLIED ART
The Ninth Circuit has attempted to provide future cases with a
guideline on approaching the subject of usefulness. If there is a dispute
regarding usefulness, then the question should go to the trier of fact. In
the Poe court's view, a court is not qualified to make such a determina-
tion, unless evidence is presented from the four factors previously listed.
Not allowing summary judgments in cases such as this is a justifiable
decision by the Ninth Circuit. As noted earlier, this area of the law has
confused courts for over thirty years.61 The concern that judges should
not arbitrate national taste, logically leads to the conclusion that a dis-
pute over an article's usefulness should be one for the trier of fact to
decide. Given the nature of the subject, most cases related to applied
works of art will inevitably contain a dispute as to the usefulness of the
article. As a result, any party attempting to either prove or disprove an
article's usefulness will be faced with a potentially lengthy suit. Yet this
57. For a discussion of these cases see supra note 10.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 5668.
59. Id.
60. The Kieselstein court gives an example of an aesthetic element that is conceptually
separable. 632 F.2d at 993. The court states:
Examples of conceptual separateness as an artistic notion may be found in many
museums today and even in the great outdoors. Professor Nimmer cites Christo's
"Running Fence" as an example of today's "conceptual art": it did not contain
sculptural features that were physically separable from the utilitarian aspects of the
fence, but the whole point of the work was that the artistic aspects of the work were
conceptually separable.
Id.
61. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 803-04.
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is a minor concern when compared to the dual interests of Congress in
protecting an artist's creativity and preventing the registration of indus-
trial products.
The court has set out four sources from which evidence can be
brought to settle the issue of usefulness. Apart from the fact that prece-
dent has never really attempted to set up a rigid test for usefulness, the
four sources chosen lead to an artificial limitation in this area of copy-
right. For example, when an article is claimed to be an "applied work of
art," a court will now have to look at a range of factors, from the intent
of the artist to the article's marketability, in order to decide if it can be
protected. Thus, it is conceivable that an article could be granted copy-
right protection merely based on the artist's state of mind, and so thwart-
ing the purpose of the copyright regulation of denying registration to
"useful products."62 This is troublesome, especially since the Ninth Cir-
cuit does not discuss the dispute over "conceptual separability" that is
articulated in Kieselstein and Esquire.
The Ninth Circuit should not have departed from the approach
taken by earlier cases. The issue of an article's usefulness cannot be lim-
ited to evidence from the four sources suggested, but must be flexible due
to the nature of an artistic work. Otherwise, not only courts, but also
artists, art experts, industrial designers and art lovers, will be restricted
to the Ninth Circuit's view of what constitutes usefulness.
David M. Cordrey
62. See supra note 48.
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